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Abstract
We investigate the implications of variations in the frequency with which hedge
fund managers update their high-water mark on fees paid by investors. We ﬁrst doc-
ument the crystallization frequencies used by Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs)
and then perform simulations and a bootstrap analysis. We ﬁnd a statistically and
economically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the crystallization frequency on the total fee load.
Hedge funds' total fee load increases signiﬁcantly as the crystallization frequency
increases. As such, our ﬁndings indicate that the total fee load not only depends
on the management fee and incentive fee, but also on the crystallization frequency
set by the manager.
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1 Introduction
The impact of the two components of hedge funds' fee structure, the incentive fee and
the high-water mark clause, on hedge fund behaviour has been discussed extensively in
the academic literature. Especially their eﬀect on fund managers' risk-taking behaviour
has received considerable attention1. However, the fee structure also has more direct
consequences for investors, apart from changing the risk proﬁle of the investment. Fees
impact long-term wealth and investors are more and more starting to realize this, not in
the least because of the current low yield environment. Consequently, hedge funds' fees
are now subject to closer scrutiny and are negotiated more often than in the past.
To illustrate this downward pressure on hedge funds' headline fee levels, we report the
management fee and incentive fee of newly launched CTAs in the BarclayHedge database
in Table 1. The table illustrates that, while there has been no signiﬁcant change in the
incentive fee levels, the average management fee has been decreasing steadily over time.
[Table 1 about here.]
The typical fee structure of hedge funds and CTAs is made up of a management fee
(usually 2% of assets under management) and an incentive fee (usually of 20% of proﬁts).
This 2/20-fee structure is and has been the standard cost for allocations in the hedge
fund industry. The incentive fee is generally supplemented with a high-water mark, such
that investors only pay an incentive fee once any previous underperformance has been
made up for.
However, the headline fee levels are only one aspect of the fee structure that should
be considered. Other elements of the fee structure also have a signiﬁcant impact on the
total fee load. One element that is usually not taken into consideration when discussing
hedge funds' fees is the frequency with which a fund updates its high-water mark. This
frequency is commonly referred to as the crystallization frequency or the incentive fee
payment schedule. The fees an investor pays to the fund manager does not only depend
on the management and the performance fee, but also on the crystallization frequency.
1Studies include Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), Hodder and Jackwerth (2007), Kouwenberg
and Ziemba (2007), Panageas and Westerﬁeld (2009), and Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009).
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The crystallization frequency is the point in time when the fund manager updates
the high-water mark and is paid the incentive fee. The crystallization frequency diﬀers
from the accrual schedule, which is the schedule used to calculate and charge the fee to
the fund's proﬁt and loss account. Whereas the process of fee accrual does not impact
investor returns, the same is not true for the fee crystallization. As the incentive fee
crystallization frequency increases, the expected total fee load charged by the hedge fund
manager increases as well.
The main contribution of our study to the existing literature on hedge funds' fee
structure is that we highlight and analyse the impact of the crystallization frequency on
hedge funds' fee load. To the authors' best knowledge, no study has yet investigated
this aspect to hedge funds' fee structure. By itself, this ﬁnding is compelling. The
crystallization frequency forms the basis for the incentive fee calculation and the way
hedge funds update their high-water mark. It has a material eﬀect on the fees investors
pay and, thus, should also inﬂuence hedge funds' risk-taking behaviour.
Our ﬁndings have several implications. First, we show that the crystallization fre-
quency has both a statistically and economically signiﬁcant impact on fees paid by in-
vestors. In the case of CTAs, and assuming a 2/20 fee structure, shifting from annual to
quarterly crystallization leads to a 49 basis points increase in the fee load (as a percentage
of assets under management). This corresponds to a 12.2% increase of an investor's total
fee load. Furthermore, an incentive fee of 15% combined with monthly crystallization
leads to the same total fee load as an incentive fee of 20% under annual crystallization.
Based on these ﬁndings, we conclude that there are three factors that investors need to
consider when evaluating the expected fee load; the level of management fee, the level
of incentive fee and the crystallization frequency of the incentive fee. In addition, in
an environment where especially management fee levels are under pressure, the relative
importance of the incentive fee and crystallization in the total fee load increases.
Second, our study also has implications for the academic literature that estimates
hedge funds' gross returns and fee loads as well as research on hedge funds' risk-taking
behaviour. To construct gross returns, previous studies in most cases assume that incen-
tive fees are paid at year-end (e.g. Brooks, Clare, and Motson (2007), French (2008) and
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Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009)), although some authors assume quarterly payment (see
Bollen and Whaley (2009) and Jorion and Schwarz (2013)). Some authors also calculate
hedge funds' historical fee loads in their analysis. For example, French (2008) estimates
that the typical investor in U.S. equity-related hedge funds has paid an annual combined
fee or total expense ratio of 3.69% p.a. over the period 2000-2007. Brooks, Clare, and
Motson (2007) ﬁnd that between 1994 and 2006 hedge fund fees averaged 5.15% annually.
Ibbotson, Chen, and Zhu (2011) suggest a lower estimate of 3.43% p.a. for the period
1995 to 2009. Similarly, Feng, Getmansky, and Kapadia (2011) report total fees over the
period 1994-2012 to be on average 3.36% of gross asset value. However, these studies do
not consider the impact of the crystallization frequency on these ﬁgures. To investigate
the importance of the crystallization frequency on fees, we require an accurate method
to move from net returns to gross returns and vice versa, while simultaneously allowing
us to vary the crystallization frequency. For this purpose we develop an algorithm for
calculating gross returns in which we let the crystallization frequency vary. This way, we
can evaluate the impact of the crystallization frequency on hedge funds' fee load. As for
hedge funds' risk-taking behaviour, our analysis has implications for the time frame over
which previous results on hedge funds' risk-taking behaviour apply. If a hedge fund man-
ager update its high-water mark more than once a year, the trading horizion is shortened
accordingly.
Third, crystallization frequencies of hedge funds have not been documented. In ad-
dition, it is possible that diﬀerences in the crystallization frequency of hedge funds are
to some extent related to diﬀerences in the ability of hedge funds subcategories to value
their underlying positions. Industry standards on crystallization for diﬀerent hedge fund
categories might therefore also diﬀer. To avoid this possibility from having an impact, we
restrict our analysis to one particular hedge fund category, namely Commodity Trading
Advisors (CTAs). Unlike some other hedge fund categories, CTAs trade almost exclu-
sively highly liquid instruments. As such, CTAs are able to value their positions on a
daily basis and, thus, do not have any practical limitations regarding the calculation of
their NAVs. A second reason why we focus on CTAs is the way the money is invested in
this industry. In many cases, investments are done through managed accounts. Clients
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then negotiate directly with the fund manager, which suggests that fee terms are more
easily and more often negotiated. To document CTAs' crystallization practices, we per-
form a survey among the constituents of the Newedge CTA Index as well as an analysis
of the fee notes of CTAs in the Tremont Advisory Shareholder Services (TASS) database.
We ﬁnd that, at least in the case of CTAs, high-water marks are most often updated
quarterly, rather than annually. This contrasts the view commonly held in the academic
literature that the high-water mark is set at the end of the year.
Even in cases where it is unlikely that the crystallization frequencies can be negoti-
ated, as is the case in comingled investment vehicles, knowledge about the eﬀect of the
crystallization frequency is important for an allocator when evaluating and comparing dif-
ferent fund investments. We stress that, while we focus on CTAs, the implications of our
study also apply to any investment vehicle whose fee structure depends on a high-water
mark provision.
In this study we focus on the impact of the crystallization frequency of the incentive
fee, and we do not go into the payment frequency of the management fee. We do this
mainly because the payment of the management fee does not depend on a fund's high-
water mark. Additionally, the vast majority of the hedge funds charge the management
fee monthly2.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data. Section
3 reports the result of our survey on crystallization and industry practices. In Section 4
we construct gross returns from observed net-of-fee returns. Section 5 presents the main
body of the analysis, where we quantify the impact of the crystallization frequency on
the total fee load and compute the trade-oﬀ that exists between diﬀerent levels of the
incentive fee and the crystallization frequency. In Section 6, we perform a number of
robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2For the Tremont Advisory Shareholder Services (TASS) database, we ﬁnd that 78% of the CTAs in
the database charge the management fee on a monthly basis. 13% charges the management fee quarterly
and 8% charges the management fee annually.
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2 Data
We analyse the impact of the crystallization frequency on fees paid by investors by using
monthly net-of-fee returns of live and dead funds labelled CTA in the BarclayHedge
Database. We use a sample that covers the period January 1994 to December 2012
to mitigate a potential survivorship bias, since most databases only started collecting
information on defunct programs from 1994 onwards3. As BarclayHedge does not report
a ﬁrst reporting date, we cannot eliminate the backﬁll bias entirely. We therefore opt
for an alternative approach and remove the ﬁrst twelve observations of a fund's return
history, following Teo (2009)4,5.
We further require at least twelve return observations for a fund to be included, and
only include funds whose monthly returns are denominated in USD or EUR. The EUR-
denominated returns are converted to USD-denominated returns, using the end-of-month
spot USD/EUR exchange rate. As the analysis also requires information on the funds'
management fee and incentive fee, we remove cases where at least one of the two variables
is unreported6.
We then ﬁlter the resulting sample of funds by looking at their self-declared strategy
description and remove funds whose description is not consistent with the deﬁnition of
CTAs. In the process, we also determine whether the program under consideration is the
fund's ﬂagship program and discard duplicates. To ensure that our results apply to funds
that can be considered part of the investable universe for most CTA investors, we remove
funds whose net-of-fee returns exhibit unusually low- or high levels of variation. To this
end, we discard funds when the standard deviation of the observed net-of-fee returns is
lower than 2% or exceeds 60% p.a. After applying these restrictions, our sample consists
3Gross returns are ﬁrst calculated using the funds' entire return history, after which the pre-1994
period is dropped.
4We ﬁrst calculate gross returns (see Section 4) using the fund's entire track record, and afterwards
drop the ﬁrst twelve observations of the fund's net-of-fee and gross returns.
5By keeping track of the amount of months that are backﬁlled when a fund is ﬁrst included to
BarclayHedge database, we tracked backﬁll bias for the period 2005-2010. For that sample period, the
median (average) backﬁll bias was twelve (fourteen) months.
6Additionally, we also exclude cases where both types of fee are zero or and cases where the fee levels
are deemed unreasonable low or high (management fee in excess of 5% p.a., incentive fees below 5% or
above 50% p.a.).
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of 1,616 unique CTA programs. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the ﬁnal set of
funds.
[Table 2 about here.]
3 Crystallization and Industry Practices
Since public hedge fund databases do not keep track of funds' incentive fee crystallization
frequency7, we perform a survey among the constituents of the Newedge CTA index (as
of May 2013). The Newedge CTA index is designed to track the largest CTAs and aims to
be representative of the managed futures space. The index is comprised of the 20 largest
managers (based on AUM) who are open to new investment and that report performance
on a daily basis to Newedge. We complete the results of the survey with information
available on the website of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)8.
The results of the survey are reported in Figure 1. Figure 1 indicates that, in the
case of CTAs, the most commonly used crystallization frequency is quarterly. In those
instances where the crystallization frequency is not quarterly, we ﬁnd that the frequency
generally tends to be higher, rather than lower. The left panel of Figure 2 reports the
share of total assets under management (AUM) of the CTAs to which every frequency
applies. While quarterly crystallization remains the most commonly applied crystalliza-
tion frequency, monthly crystallization applies to a larger share of total AUM than one
would suspect from Figure 1. Finally, we also quantify the scope of the survey vis-à-vis
total AUM by the CTA industry. The right panel of Figure 2 plots the results, which
shows that the constituents of the Newedge CTA index cover 43% of assets managed by
CTAs that report to BarclayHedge.
[Figure 1 about here.]
7TASS's questionnaire only inquires about the management fee's payment frequency; the other widely
used databases' questionnaires and manuals (Hedge Fund Research (HFR), CISDM, and BarclayHedge)
indicate that the databases do not keep track of the fee payment frequencies.
8In particular, we make use of the SEC's Investment Adviser Public Disclosure (IAPD) and the
Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database.
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As mentioned above, public databases do not keep track of the crystallization fre-
quency in a systematic way. However, the fee notes in the Tremont Advisory Shareholder
Services (TASS) database in a number of cases do provide a suﬃcient amount of infor-
mation to pinpoint the crystallization frequency. Therefore, and in addition to the above
survey, we also examine the fee notes of defunct and live CTAs reported in the TASS
database. The results are also reported in Figure 1. Comparing these results with those
of our own survey suggests that the sample of funds from TASS is characterised by higher
crystallization frequencies. These diﬀerences could be due to survivorship bias as well as
diﬀerences in fund size. Nevertheless, the results for the TASS sample corroborate our
earlier ﬁnding that quarterly is the most common crystallization frequency. When funds
use a crystallization frequency other than quarterly crystallization, the frequency tends
to be higher rather than lower.
[Figure 2 about here.]
For completeness, we also look at the relationship between the reported fee levels
and the crystallization frequency of the funds. It could be that funds with lower crys-
tallization frequencies have higher incentive fee levels, such that the total fee load is
comparable. To verify that this is not the case, we group the sample of funds in TASS
based on their reported crystallization frequency and analyse the average incentive and
management fee of the diﬀerent groups. The results, reported in Table 3, indicate that
funds with a higher crystallization frequency tend to have higher headline incentive fee
levels. For example, the average incentive fee level for funds with monthly crystallization
(22.38%) is signiﬁcantly higher than that of funds that employ a quarterly crystallization
frequency (21.05%), with a p-value of 0.0775. In addition, we also ﬁnd that the headline
management fee level tends to increase as the crystallization frequency increases. These
results suggest that funds that have higher a crystallization frequency on average also
exhibit higher headline fee levels.
[Table 3 about here.]
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4 Construction of Gross Returns
As mentioned in the introduction, analysing the impact of the crystallization frequency
on hedge funds their fee load requires a reasonable method to calculate hedge funds'
gross returns and to charge fees to investors under various crystallization frequencies. To
this end, we develop an algorithm that achieves this objective. We provide a thorough
description of the algorithm in the appendix.
To calculate gross returns for the sample of CTAs, we assume that CTAs apply quar-
terly crystallization to charge incentive fees. Our survey results and the results from
TASS's fee notes suggest that this is the most commonly used crystallization frequency.
In addition, when CTAs apply another crystallization frequency, they generally tend to
use higher crystallization frequencies. As such, the assumption of quarterly fee crystal-
lization should lead to fairly conservative estimates of the funds' gross returns.
In Table 4 we compare the observed net-of-fee CTA returns with the obtained gross
CTA returns. Funds appear to earn signiﬁcantly higher risk-adjusted returns  measured
by the annualized Sharpe ratio  based on gross returns, as compared to net-of-fee re-
turns. Also, both skewness and kurtosis are signiﬁcantly higher for the gross returns.
Consequently, we ﬁnd a higher proportion of cases in which the Jarque-Bera test for
normality rejects the null hypothesis of normality. Finally, we ﬁnd that both net-of-fee
returns and gross returns of CTAs exhibit negative autocorrelation.
[Table 4 about here.]
5 Incentive Fee Crystallization and Fee Load
5.1 Analysis of the Historical Eﬀect
As an introduction to our main analysis, we ﬁrst estimate the crystallization frequency's
potential historical eﬀect on investor wealth. This way, we can get a feel of the economic
signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of crystallization. Using the data set of gross returns obtained
in Section 4, we re-apply the fund's reported headline fee levels under diﬀerent crystal-
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lization frequencies. This way we obtain net-of-fee returns under diﬀerent crystallization
frequencies as well as the corresponding fee load.
In Table 5 we report the average gross return, average net-of-fee return, and the
average fee load under the diﬀerent fee crystallization schemes. The reported average net-
of-fee returns are all statistically diﬀerent from each other at the 1% level of signiﬁcance
(p-values unreported for conciseness). Furthermore, the results suggest that investors
whose investment is subject to quarterly (monthly) crystallization, will earn net-of-fee
returns which are on average 25 (42) basis points per year lower than in the case of
annual crystallization. To put these ﬁgures into perspective, an annual diﬀerence of 42
basis points over a 10-year period will compound to a diﬀerence of 9.32% in the expected
capital gain. For a MUSD 1 initial investment, this diﬀerence equals USD 63,303.
Even more important than these absolute numbers, is the impact on the risk-adjusted
performance. Our results suggest that when investors move from annual to monthly
crystallization, the Sharpe ratio deteriorates from 0.4 to 0.34, a 15.65% decrease.
[Table 5 about here.]
We also observe from Table 5 that management fees are slightly lower than 2% p.a.,
despite the positive drift in CTAs their returns. This is consistent with our ﬁnding that
management fees, at least for newly launched funds, tend to be below 2% p.a. on average
(see Table 1).
5.2 Simulation-based Analysis
To study the eﬀect of the crystallization frequency on the level of fees investors pay, we
now analyse the eﬀect of crystallization in a controlled environment. In particular, we
simulate monthly gross returns assuming they follow a normal distribution. We use the
data set of gross returns calculated above to determine the appropriate parameters for
the normal distribution. As such, we set the mean gross return equal to 0.768% per
month and we assume a standard deviation of 4.683% per month (see Table 4). Next, we
generate 10,000 sample paths of monthly gross returns and we apply a standard 2/20-
fee structure under diﬀerent crystallization frequencies. The risk-free rate used in the
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calculations is the average monthly US risk-free rate over the period 1994-2012, 0.28%
per month. We use this framework to examine the impact of the crystallization frequency
on the total fee load.
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results for one-year, three-year, and ﬁve-year investment
horizons. We consider periods up to ﬁve years as this corresponds to the average age of
the CTAs in the sample (see Table 2). As such, our analysis covers the relevant horizion
over which the eﬀect of crystallization applies for the majority of hedge fund investors.
To gauge the signiﬁcance of the results, we indicate whether the obtained fee level diﬀers
signiﬁcantly from the fee load under annual crystallization. We set annual crystallization
as the benchmark since most previous research made the assumption that the incentive
fee is paid at the end of the year. Our results illustrate that a higher crystallization
frequency always leads to a higher average fee load. Management fees are slightly higher
than 2% and increasing in time due to the positive drift in the simulated gross asset values
(GAV). For ease of comparison, Figure 3 and Figure 4 plot the fee load under diﬀerent
crystallization frequencies and the diﬀerence with annual crystallization, respectively.
[Table 6 about here.]
It is evident from panel A of Table 6 that increasing the investment horizon dampens
the impact of a higher crystallization frequency on fee load. We can explain this ﬁnding
by the fact that the fee loads reported for the three- and ﬁve-year investment horizons
are an average across the individual years. In years where a fund is not able to charge
incentive fees, the total fee is the same under diﬀerent crystallization frequencies. Despite
this downward drag on the total fee load, caused by years in which only a management
fee is paid, the diﬀerence in fee load for the diﬀerent crystallization frequencies remains
signiﬁcant.
Another important factor that impacts the total fee load paid by investors is the
volatility level of the program. To illustrate the impact of higher volatility on the diﬀer-
ences in fee load, we redo the simulation but change the standard deviation of the gross
returns. In particular, we analyse the total fee load in the case of a 10%, 20%, and 30%
volatility p.a. At the same time, we hold the expected return ﬁxed to single out the eﬀect
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of higher volatility.
The results are reported in Table 7. What is interesting to note is that the diﬀerence in
total fee load for diﬀerent crystallization frequencies is increasing in the volatility. As an
example, consider the diﬀerence between quarterly and annual crystallization. Assuming
an annual volatility of 10%, the diﬀerence in total fee load is 15 basis points, which
suggests that quarterly crystallization leads to a fee load on average 4.75% higher than
annual crystallization. However, assuming an annual volatility of 20% this diﬀerence
increases to 25 basis points (7.08% increase in fee load). If we increase annual volatility
to 30% p.a., the diﬀerence becomes 54 basis points, or an annual fee load that is 12.50%
higher than under annual crystallization.
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Table 7 about here.]
5.3 Block Bootstrap Analysis
To analyse the impact of the crystallization frequency more empirically, we apply a block
bootstrap by randomly sampling gross return histories and calculating the fee load under
diﬀerent crystallization regimes. The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to
relax the distributional assumptions made with regard to the return generating process
in Subsection 5.2. A block bootstrap allows us to account for higher moments in monthly
returns (e.g. CTAs' returns exhibit positive skewness) and to preserve any autocorrelation
present in the gross data. These properties of the return generating process can have a
material impact on the results of the analysis and investors' total fee load.
In performing the block bootstrap, we consider all the potential 12/36/60-month
samples in the data set of gross returns and pick 10,000 12-months, 36-month and 60-
month samples. To avoid look-ahead bias, we allow the sampling procedure to select
incomplete samples occurring at the end of a fund's track record. In those cases where a
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fund terminates before the end of the sample period, we assume that investors redeem9.
We also assume that every draw starts the beginning of a calendar year (i.e. from January
onwards). As before, we consider the case of a 2/20-fee structure, such that the obtained
fee loads can be compared to the results reported in Subsection 5.2. Diﬀerences in the
fee load and diﬀerences between the various crystallization frequencies should then be a
consequence of features of CTAs' return generating process  including fund termination
 we have not modelled in Subsection 5.2.
We report the results for the bootstrap in panel B of Table 6. Similarly to the
simulation results, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly higher fee loads as the crystallization frequency
increases. The eﬀect is also economically signiﬁcant. For the one-year investment horizon,
the total fee load is 49 (82) basis points p.a. higher in the case of quarterly (monthly)
crystallization when compared to annual crystallization. This suggests that, under a
2/20-fee structure, the fee load is expected to be 12.2% (20.5%) higher if a manager
charges the incentive fee quarterly (monthly), rather than annually. If the investment
horizon is extended to ﬁve years, the diﬀerence decreases 23 (40) basis points p.a., a
diﬀerence of 6.5% (11.4%).
Another notable ﬁnding is that for the one-year investment horizon, the management
fee in the case of monthly crystallization is signiﬁcantly lower than that under annual
crystallization. This illustrates the fact that a higher crystallization frequency lowers the
NAV on which funds can charge the management fee, since an incentive fee payment
lower the investor's NAV. However, in economic terms this eﬀect is small. As such, it is
more than oﬀset by the higher fee load that results from the higher incentive fees paid.
Next, we have a look at the distribution of the diﬀerences in fee loads. From the
above analysis, we collect the set of diﬀerences in incentive fee under annual and quarterly
crystallization. We do this both for the simulated sample and the bootstrapped sample.
The results, reported in Figure 5 , illustrate that a higher crystallization frequency always
leads to a higher incentive fee load (which is also what to expect). This is evident from
the fact that all obtained diﬀerences are nonzero. Consequently, the distribution is highly
9While most of these occurrences will correspond to fund terminations due to bad performance, we
nevertheless treat the fund's exit as full redemption. If there is a positive accrued interest fee at the time
of the last observation, it will be charged to the investor's account.
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skewed to the right10. The Figure also shows that in approximately 35.63% (41.77%) of
the simulated (bootstrapped) cases, the two crystallization frequencies do not show any
diﬀerence in fee load. This is the case whenever (a) a fund does not get over its initial
high-water mark, (b) when new highs are reached but not crystallized and (c) when the
fund sets new high-water marks at every crystallization date.
[Figure 5 about here.]
In the ﬁrst two instances, investors only pay the management fee, which is the same
for both crystallization frequencies. Of course, investors invest with a positive view on the
investment's future performance. An unintended consequence of a higher crystallization
frequency is therefore that the investors will pay more (i.e. there will be a positive
diﬀerence in the fee load) at times when investors are generally less satisﬁed with the
fund's performance.
To see this, consider the following case. When a fund manager, during a particular
year, performs very well and continuously sets new highs until the end of the calendar
year, it does not matter what crystallization frequency is applied. However, in cases
where the fund's NAV at year-end drops below a high-water mark set during the year 
the diﬀerence in fee load under diﬀerent crystallization frequencies will be positive. In
those cases, investors will be paying higher fees while at the same time the fund's newly
crystallized high-water mark will actually be above the NAV at the end of the year (i.e.
a drop in NAV). This makes it clear that a higher crystallization frequency will tend
to decrease the fund manager's investment horizon and lower the incentive to perform
subsequent to the crystallization.
When we condition on those bootstrapped cases where an incentive fee is actually
payable, the diﬀerence in incentive fee load is 78 basis points higher under quarterly crys-
tallization, as compared to annual crystallization. Comparing this result to the uncon-
ditional average, a 49 basis points diﬀerence, suggests that in those cases that investors
actually pay an incentive fee, the fee load will be higher than our main results would
suggest.
10This particular distribution is also the reason is why all tests of statistical signiﬁcance are done using
an empirical t-distribution (bootstrap).
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5.4 Trade-oﬀ between Incentive Fee and Payment Frequency
Thus far, we have assumed a standard 2/20-fee structure to analyse the impact of diﬀerent
payment frequencies. The analysis has shown that, when investors want to compare the
(expected) fee load between diﬀerent funds, such a comparison will be inaccurate if funds
diﬀer in terms of the incentive fee payment frequency. In this subsection, we quantify the
trade-oﬀ that exists between the incentive fee and the crystallization frequency, keeping
ﬁxed the level and payment frequency of the management fee. This trade-oﬀ might be
relevant if the crystallization frequency and incentive fee level are considered negotiable
factors.
To ensure that our obtained estimates of the fee load are close to what an investor
can expect in reality, the ﬁgures are also based on the block bootstrap outlined above. In
particular, we calculate the fee load for 10,000 randomly drawn three-year sample paths
of gross returns and vary the crystallization frequency and the incentive fee level.
Table 8 reports the size of the eﬀect for diﬀerent combinations of both negotiable
factors. Unlike what incentive fee headline levels would suggest, the table illustrates that
changes in the crystallization frequency lead to considerable diﬀerences in total fee load.
For example, the results suggest that a 15% incentive fee with monthly crystallization
leads to a similar total fee load as a 20% incentive fee with annual crystallization (not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent).
[Table 8 about here.]
6 Robustness Checks
We now perform a number of robustness checks with regard to the level of the eﬀect.
Relaxing or imposing additional restrictions on the dataset used in the analysis will
not change our ﬁnding that higher crystallization frequencies increase investors' fee load.
However, it might have an inﬂuence on level of the fee loads and the economic signiﬁcance
of the eﬀect of crystallization.
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6.1 Impact of Backﬁll Bias
In our baseline analysis we account for backﬁll bias by discarding the ﬁrst twelve obser-
vations of a fund's track record. Here we investigate the importance of this assumption
for our baseline results.
To this end, we perform the following analysis. We redo the bootstrap analysis used
in section 5.3 a 100 times, both for the baseline gross return data set and the newly
obtained gross return data that does not correct for backﬁll bias. Then, we test whether
the results in both cases diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Panel A of Table 9 reports the result. In
line with our expectations, we ﬁnd that a potential backﬁll bias tends to upward bias the
obtained incentive fee loads. Nevertheless, the size of the diﬀerence in fee loads remains
similar in both instances, both in magnitude and statistically signiﬁcance (not reported).
[Table 9 about here.]
6.2 Impact of Fund Size
Another possible concern, raised by Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007), is that funds with
assets under management below MUSD 20 might be too small for many institutional
investors. To ensure that the magnitude of fee load diﬀerences is representative and do
not deviate too much from the fee load institutional investors can expect, we perform the
following robustness check.
Similar to the previous robustness check, we redo the bootstrap analysis a 100 times,
but impose an additional restriction when selecting a sample path. In particular, we only
select a sample path if  at the start  the corresponding fund's assets under management
are above MUSD 20. To avoid look-ahead bias, the fund's size is allowed to drop below
MUSD 20 in subsequent months. Results are reported in panel B of Table 9. Consistent
with the ﬁnding that small funds tend to outperform more mature funds, we ﬁnd that
the fee load is lower when we omit smaller funds.
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6.3 Impact of Risk-taking Behaviour
To perform the bootstrap in the baseline case, we assume that every sample path drawn
from the gross return dataset starts in January. However, Nanda and Aragon (2012)
show that hedge funds take part in tournament behaviour. Hedge funds tend to increase
their risk-proﬁle in the second half of the year when they are underperforming, relative
to their peers. As such, the funds' risk-proﬁle could diﬀer throughout the calendar-year,
and thus have an impact on our reported fee loads. To check whether this is the case, we
redo the bootstrap and select sample paths that correspond to actual calendar-years.
The results are reported in panel C of Table 9. The p-values in Panel C indicate that
in most cases, the total fee load is somewhat higher if we use actual calendar-years. We
interpret this ﬁnding as being in line with the results of Aragon and Nanda (2012) their
ﬁndings on risk-taking behaviour among hedge funds. Our results indicate that, if we take
into account intra-year patterns in the funds' returns, we ﬁnd higher total fee loads. This
result therefore suggests that funds actively change their exposure to safeguard accrued
incentive fees, causing our results to exhibit slightly higher fee loads if we take these
intra-year patterns into account.
7 Conclusion
The fee load of investors does not depend on the headline fee levels alone. Other aspects
of the fee structure should also be considered when analysing fee structures that include
incentive fees and a high-water mark provision. One such factor is the frequency with
which hedge funds update their high-water mark.
To our best knowledge we are the ﬁrst to document the impact of the crystallization
frequency on hedge funds' fee loads. Using simulations and a bootstrap based on a
comprehensive data set of CTAs, our main ﬁnding is that, under a 2/20-fee structure,
quarterly crystallization leads to a fee load which is on average 49 basis points p.a.
higher than under annual crystallization. This diﬀerence is economically large and should
be a relevant consideration when discussing the fee structure. Our results are relevant
17
for allocators who want to assess the fee load of fee schemes which diﬀer in terms of
crystallization frequency. Moreover, we ﬁnd that diﬀerent headline fee levels can lead to
similar total fee loads, once the crystallization frequency is taken into consideration.
In addition, a failure to take into account the frequency with which the high-water
mark is updated leads to erroneous estimates of funds their gross returns. In particu-
lar, assuming an annual payment of the incentive fee when the industry standard of a
number of hedge fund categories is akin to quarterly crystallization, will lead to the un-
derestimation of the gross returns of those hedge fund categories. As such, while annual
crystallization might be common among some hedge fund categories, we document that
quarterly crystallization is the most common crystallization frequency among CTAs.
Our analysis of the crystallization frequency suggests several avenues for future re-
search. First, we did not go into the implications of the payment frequency on the
risk-taking behaviour of hedge funds and CTAs. Changes in the crystallization frequency
alter the horizon over which the implications of the high-water mark on risk-taking be-
haviour should be evaluated. As such, it can be expected that a higher crystallization
frequency leads to a shorter trading horizon, and thus might conﬂict with a fund's stated
strategy horizon. Second, we only cover one hedge fund category. As such, there might
be considerable diﬀerences in the crystallization frequencies applied by diﬀerent hedge
fund categories. These diﬀerences might be related to hedge fund characteristics such as
the liquidity of the strategy.
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Appendix: Description Algorithm for Gross Returns
Here we describe the algorithm we use to compute monthly gross returns from reported
net-of-fee returns. Our approach allows for a monthly estimation of gross returns under
diﬀerent crystallization regimes (monthly or lower frequency).
The algorithm is based on the following set of assumptions:
1. The Gross Asset Value at the fund's inception (GAV0) is equal to 100.
2. The algorithm is based on a single-investor assumption.
3. The management fee is paid monthly11.
The Gross Return at time t (GrossRett) equals:
GrossRett =
GAVt
GAVt−1
− 1 (1)
where GAVt and GAVt−1 are the Gross Asset Value at month t and t−1, respectively.
The Management Fee (MgtFeet) paid in month t equals:
MgtFeet =
GAVt
GAVt−1
·NAVt−1 · MF%
12
(2)
where MF% is the management fee (p.a.). The Total Management Fee Paid up to
month t (TotalMgtFeePaidt) then equals
TotalMgtFeePaidt =
t∑
i=1
MgtFeei (3)
Interest Earned (InterestEarnedt) equals the amount of interest earned by the man-
ager on the excess cash and cash deposited in the margin account:
InterestEarnedt = NAVt−1 ·Rft (4)
11This assumption can easily be relaxed to a diﬀerent payment frequency by handling the payment of
the management fee in the same way as the incentive fee. We nevertheless ﬁx the payment frequency to
monthly because an analysis of the managment fee is not the thrust of the analysis.
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whereRft is the risk-free rate in month t. Total Interest Earned (TotalInterestEarnedt)
is the sum of all interest earned on cash up to month t:
TotalInterestEarnedt =
t∑
i=1
InterestEarnedi (5)
Using the above deﬁnitions, the Preliminary Net Asset Value at time t (PrelNAVt)
is then:
PrelNAVt =
GAVt
GAVt−1
·NAVt−1 − TotalMgmFeePaidt − TotalIntEarnedt (6)
We substract the management fee and the interest earned from the gross asset value.
That way the manager will only earn an incentive fee on performance in excess of any
management fee charged or any risk-free return earned on cash12. For the next set of
equations, we introduce an indicator (Crystt) that takes on the value 1 if a crystallization
occurs, and zero otherwise.
The Accrued Incentive Fee (AccrIncFeet) is a percentage of the performance  the
incentive fee IF%  in excess of the current high-water mark (HWMt−1):max(0, P relNAVt −HWMt−1) · IF% if Crystt = 00 if Crystt = 1 (7)
Therefore, the incentive fee is accrued when no crystallization occurs and will equal
zero when crystallization takes place. In that case, the incentive fee is paid to the fund
manager. The accrued incentive fee over the period since the last crystallization is then
added to the Incentive Fee Paid variable (IncFeePaidt):max(0, P relNAVt −HWMt−1) · IF%+ IncFeePaidt−1 if Crystt = 1IncFeePaidt−1 if Crystt = 0 (8)
The High-Water Mark at time t (HWMt) is updated to the current preliminary Net
12We take this into consideration because CTAs typically hold up to 80% of the money in a cash
account.
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Asset Value if crystallization occurs and is not updated if no crystallization occurs:max(PrelNAVt, HWMt−1) if Crystt = 1HWMt−1 if Crystt = 0 (9)
The Net Asset Value at time t (NAVt) equals:
NAVt = PrelNAVt + TotalInterestEarnedt − AccrIncFeet − IncFeePaidt (10)
Since no closed-form solution is available, we solve forGAVt numerically. In particular,
we determine the value of GAVt that equates theNAVt computed in equation (10)  based
on GAVt  to the observed NAV at time t. We then store the obtained value of GAVt
and move to the next month, calculating GAVt in an iterative way. When we charge fees
in the subsequent analysis, we also use the above equations to go from GAVt to NAVt.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the Crystallization Frequencies of the Incentive Fee
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Based on survey conducted in May 2013 and Tremont Advisory Shareholder Services, 2012. For
the Newedge CTA index, 4 funds did not disclose their payment frequency. In the case of TASS,
the fee notes of 185 funds (out of a sample of 408 fee notes) contained a suﬃcient amount of
information to determine the payment frequency of the incentive fee.
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Figure 2: Scope of the Survey
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Figure 3: Total Fee Load under Diﬀerent Crystallization Frequencies
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Figure 4: Comparing the Total Fee Load with Annual Crystallization
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Figure 5: Distribution of the Diﬀerence in Incentive Fee Load  Quarterly Versus Annual
Crystallization for One-Year Horizon
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Table 1: Evolution in CTA Headline Fee Levels
Number of
funds
Management
fee
Bootstrapped
95% CI
Incentive
fee
Bootstrapped
95% CI
1994-1998 295 1.97% [1.88%;2.07%] 20.63% [20.29%;20.98%]
1999-2003 394 1.71% [1.65%;1.78%] 20.51% [20.23%;20.83%]
2004-2008 377 1.67% [1.6%;1.73%] 20.71% [20.3%;21.16%]
2009-2012 163 1.62% [1.51%;1.72%] 20.64% [19.91%;21.42%]
This table reports the number of launched funds, average incentive fee and management
fee for CTAs in BarclayHedge for diﬀerent sub-periods.
Table 2: Summary Statistics CTAs
Mean Min P25 P50 P75 Max
Monthly net-of-fee return 0.567% -6.474% 0.061% 0.505% 0.988% 9.524%
Standard deviation of
monthly net-of-fee returns
5.084% 0.610% 2.753% 4.273% 6.586% 17.173%
Age (years) 5.4 1.0 2.1 3.8 7.0 19.0
Management fee 1.869% 0% 2% 2% 2% 5%
Incentive fee 20.561% 5% 20% 20% 20% 50%
This table reports summary statistics for the sample of 1616 CTAs from the BarclayHedge
database.
Table 3: Relationship between Crystallization Frequency and Fee Levels
Crystallization
Frequency
Incentive
Fee
Bootstrapped
95% CI
Management
Fee
Bootstrapped
95% CI
Monthly 22.38% [20.72%;24.23%] 1.63% [1.36%;1.91%]
Quarterly 21.05% [20.35%;21.8%] 1.64% [1.48%;1.79%]
Semi-annual 20.00% [20%;20%] 1.93% [1.79%;2%]
Annual 19.62% [17.69%;21.15%] 1.47% [1.17%;1.81%]
This table reports the average incentive fee level and management fee level under diﬀerent
crystallization frequencies for sample of CTAs in TASS.
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Table 4: Comparison of Net-of-fee Returns and Gross Returns
Net-of-fee returns Gross returns p-value
Average return 0.567% 0.768% 0
Standard deviation of monthly returns 5.084% 4.683% 1.00E-04
Annualized Sharpe Ratio 0.483 0.691 0
Skewness 0.313 0.454 0
Kurtosis 4.820 5.126 0.0133
First order serial autocorrelation -0.011 -0.004 0.1382
JB-Statistic (Percentage of rejections) 47.215% 52.228%
This table compares net-of-fee returns with the estimated gross returns based on the algo-
rithm described above for the set of 1616 CTAs.
The reported p-values test the diﬀerence in means using the empirical t-distribution (boot-
strap).
Table 5: Summary Statistics historical fee-loads
Average Standard
Deviation
Sharpe
Ratio
Gross
Return
8.65% 16.22% 0.61
Net-of-fee
Return
Standard
Deviation
Sharpe
Ratio
Management
Fee
Incentive
Fee
Monthly 4.90% 16.75% 0.34 1.933% 2.411%
Quarterly 5.07% 16.33% 0.37 1.934% 2.260%
Semi-annual 5.20% 16.05% 0.38 1.934% 2.159%
Annual 5.32% 15.75% 0.40 1.935% 2.141%
This table reports the average annual gross return, average standard deviation and
average Sharpe ratio for the set of 1616 CTAs. The second part of the table re-
ports the corresponding statistics for the net-of-fee returns, as well as the average
management fee and incentive fee.
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Table 6: Impact of Crystallization on Fee Load
Panel A
Crystallization Frequency Incentive Fee Management Fee Total Fee Load
1-year horizon Monthly 2.661%*** 2.018%*** 4.679%***
Quarterly 2.334%*** 2.022%** 4.356%***
Semi-annual 2.061%*** 2.024% 4.085%***
Annual 1.771% 2.026% 3.797%
3-year horizon Monthly 1.913%*** 2.029%* 3.942%***
Quarterly 1.770%*** 2.030% 3.800%***
Semi-annual 1.649%*** 2.030% 3.680%***
Annual 1.506% 2.031% 3.538%
5-year horizon Monthly 1.671%*** 2.035% 3.706%***
Quarterly 1.573%*** 2.035% 3.609%***
Semi-annual 1.492%*** 2.036% 3.528%***
Annual 1.390% 2.035% 3.426%
Panel B
Crystallization Frequency Incentive Fee Management Fee Total Fee Load
1-year horizon Monthly 2.762%*** 2.070%*** 4.836%***
Quarterly 2.423%*** 2.073% 4.500%***
Semi-annual 2.188%*** 2.075% 4.266%***
Annual 1.932% 2.077% 4.012%
3-year horizon Monthly 2.063%*** 2.059% 4.127%***
Quarterly 1.862%*** 2.060% 3.926%***
Semi-annual 1.728%*** 2.061% 3.793%***
Annual 1.606% 2.061% 3.671%
5-year horizon Monthly 1.839%*** 2.050% 3.894%***
Quarterly 1.667%*** 2.0511% 3.723%***
Semi-annual 1.554%*** 2.052% 3.670%***
Annual 1.440% 2.052% 3.4960%
This table reports the average incentive fee, average management fee, and average total fee load
for two analyses. Panel A reports the results for a simulation of funds' gross returns, under the
assumption of normal distribution, with a mean of 0.768% per month and a standard deviation
of 4.683% per month. Panel B shows the results from performing a block bootstrap where 12,
36, or 60 month blocks of gross returns are drawn from the obtained sample of CTAs. Fee
load equals the average annual fee load over the investment horizon, as a percentage of initial
NAV/NAV at the end of the previous year.
Asterisks report statistically signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence between of the obtained fee levels and
the benchmark category (annual crystallization) at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level of
signiﬁcance. Signiﬁcance tests based on the empirical t-distribution (bootstrap).
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Table 7: The Impact of Volatility on Fee Load
Crystallization Frequency
10% volatility Incentive Fee Management Fee Total Fee Load
Monthly 1.365%*** 2.034% 3.398%***
Quarterly 1.282%*** 2.034% 3.316%***
Semi-annual 1.214%*** 2.035% 3.248%***
Annual 1.131% 2.035% 3.166%
20% volatility
Monthly 2.241%*** 2.027%* 4.268%***
Quarterly 2.056%*** 2.029% 4.085%***
Semi-annual 1.895%*** 2.030% 3.924%***
Annual 1.707% 2.030% 3.737%
30% volatility
Monthly 3.159%*** 2.018%* 5.177%***
Quarterly 2.856%*** 2.020% 4.877%***
Semi-annual 2.606%*** 2.022% 4.628%***
Annual 2.312% 2.022% 4.335%
This table reports the average incentive fee, management fee, and total fee load for diﬀerent
levels of volatility, keeping the expected return constant. We reports the results for a simu-
lation of funds' gross returns, under the assumption of normal distribution, with a mean of
0.768% per month and a standard deviation of 10%, 20%, and 30% p.a. respectively. We
report the results for a 3-year investment horizon. The fee load equals the average annual
fee load over the investment horizon, as a percentage of initial NAV/NAV at the end of the
previous year.
Asterisks report statistically signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence between of the obtained fee levels
and the benchmark category (annual crystallization) at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***)
level of signiﬁcance. Signiﬁcance tests based on the empirical t-distribution (bootstrap).
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Table 8: Trade-oﬀ between Crystallization frequency and Incentive fee
Incentive fee (%)
Crystallization Frequency 5 10 15 20 25 30
Monthly 2.574% 3.071% 3.599% 4.083% 4.610% 5.238%
Quarterly 2.527% 2.970% 3.456% 3.883% 4.359% 4.937%
Semi-annual 2.495% 2.908% 3.364% 3.753% 4.196% 4.731%
Annual 2.463% 2.844% 3.264% 3.622% 4.033% 4.528%
This table reports the total fee load under diﬀerent combinations of the both negotiable
factors, the incentive fee level and the crystallization frequency. The management fee
is paid monthly and ﬁxed at 2% p.a. The fee load is estimated by drawing random
three-year sample paths from the gross CTA return data and calculating the fee load,
varying the crystallization frequency and the level of the incentive fee.
Table 9: Results Robustness Checks
Robustness check Baseline
result
Result under
robustness check
p-value
Backﬁll Bias Monthly 4.107% 4.379% 0
Quarterly 3.913% 4.170% 0
Semi-Annual 3.784% 4.031% 0
Annual 3.656% 3.893% 0
Fund Size Monthly 3.653% 0
Quarterly 3.487% 0
Semi-Annual 3.373% 0
Annual 3.258% 0
Risk-taking Behaviour Monthly 4.107% 0.4827
Quarterly 3.920% 0.0701
Semi-Annual 3.792% 0.0408
Annual 3.710% 0
This table reports the total fee load for a three-year investment horizon for the baseline
case, and a set of three robustness checks.
The reported p-values test the diﬀerence in means using the empirical t-distribution
(bootstrap).
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